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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Article 
VIII §5 of the Constitution of Utah; Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(4) and §78-2a-3(j) 
(1996); and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (2000). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs objections to jury instructions 
and appellate review of such objections. A complete copy of the rule is attached as 
Addenda A. 
NATURE AND FACTS OF THE CASE 
This case involves the purchase of a residential home and attached indoor pool 
("Home") by the Plaintiff/Appellee, Linda Brown (cMs. Brown"), from Defendants 
Robert and Owna Miller ("Millers"). Defendant/Appellant Wardley Better Homes & 
Gardens, Inc. ("Wardley") acting through its agent, Defendant Gerry Richards, 
("Richards") represented the Millers. [R. 15-17] Richards and Wardley were 
represented by the same counsel at trial, however, only Wardley, through new counsel, 
appeals the jury's verdict. Ms. Brown agreed to purchase the Home from the Millers for 
$109,000.00. She conditioned this agreement upon satisfaction of five contingencies: 
1) the sale of her home; 2) a satisfactory inspection of the Home; 3) acceptance of the 
Miller's disclosures; 4) her ability to get financing; and 5) the Home appraising at or 
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above the asking price of $109,000.00. [R. 15-17] 
The facts as stated in Wardley's Brief are largely correct and accurate as to the 
chronology of events and general evidence presented at trial. It should be specifically 
noted, however, that the fraud claim was based upon a misrepresentation from Richards 
to Ms. Brown. Specifically, Richards indicated that the appraisal for the property had 
come in at $103,138.00. Since this was less than $109,000.00, Ms. Brown asked 
Richards why the appraisal was so low. Richards represented the appraisal did not 
include the value of the swimming pool and later informed Ms. Brown that the 
swimming pool would add $15,000.00 to the value of the property. Therefore, in 
reliance upon Richards" statements that the property was worth $118,000.00, 
Ms. Brown paid $109,000.00. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
At trial, all claims were dismissed by stipulation except for a claim of fraud 
against Richards and Wardley; and a breach of contract claim against the Millers. 
During trial, the appraiser testified the Home was appraised at $103,138.00 under the 
cost method and $100,000.00 according to the more accurate comparative method. 
[426 Transcript, pp.20-21 The $100,000.00 value was accepted by counsel for both 
sides as the more accurate value of the Home for purposes of calculating damages. 
[R. 278, 426 Transcript, pp. 148-151]. At the close of Ms. Brown's case in chief, 
counsel for Wardley failed to move for a directed verdict on the fraud and punitive 
damages claims. [R. 369]. However, Wardley did acknowledge that it was vicariously 
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liable for compensatory damages if the jury found Richard's representations were 
fraudulent, and argued the jury should be instructed that such liability would be the 
difference between the actual value of the Home ($100,000.00) and the amount paid for 
the Home ($109,000.00). [426 Transcript, p. 150] Counsel for Ms. Brown concurred 
that this was an accurate measure of damages and the Court ordered counsel that the 
jury should be advised of this damages formula by way of an instruction. [426 
Transcript, pp. 159-160] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case requires the Court to do two things: (1) interpret the General Verdict 
Sheet; and (2) determine whether compensatory damages should be capped at $9,000.00 
by stipulation. Wardley interprets the General Verdict Sheet as containing two verdicts, 
one against Richards for compensatory and punitive damages, and the other against 
Wardley for punitive damages. However, a review of the record shows the jury 
awarded $18,000.00 in compensatory and $27,000.00 in punitive damages and allocated 
these between the responsible parties. 
At the close of Ms. Brown's case in chief, the record reveals a stipulation 
between the parties for an instruction advising the jury to calculate compensatory 
damages as the difference between the amount paid for the Home and the actual value 
of the Home. This stipulation is unenforceable because the stipulated instruction did 
not go to the jury, and Wardley did not object to the damages instruction that was 
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submitted to the jury. Furthermore, Wardley's counsel did not argue damages to the 
jury and failed to contest the discrepancy between the stipulated instruction and the 
instruction given in its Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. Inasmuch as 
Wardley has not attempted to enforce the stipulation since the close of Ms. Brown's 
case in chief, it is prevented from doing so on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Wardley is liable for all damages awarded by the jury because Richards* fraud 
was committed in the furtherance of Wardley's interest and ratified by Wardley. 
In its principal memorandum, Wardley consistently claims a separate and 
distinct damage award was incorrectly entered against it by the jury1. In its 
Memorandum Decision on Wardley's motion for judgement notwithstanding the 
verdict, the trial court recognized the verdict was not two separate judgments for 
compensatory and punitive damages against Richards and Wardley, but a single 
judgment for $18,000.00 compensatory damages and $27,000.00 punitive damages2. 
"...the trial court refused to direct a verdict in Wardley's favor for any independent 
liability and even allowed the jury to render separate verdicts against Richards and 
Wardley. (Brief of Appellant, p. 7) 
"...the trial court failed to dismiss the claims against Wardley and allowed the jury 
to return a verdict against it" (Brief of Appellant, p. 8) 
"...Allowing the jury to return separate verdicts against Wardley and Ms. Brown(sic) 
when Wardley should have only been vicariously liable to Ms. Brown for Richards' 
wrongful conduct, would permit Ms. Brown to recover twice for the same damages/' 
(Brief of Appellant, p. 9-10) 
"...Without allegations or evidence to support a claim that Wardley was somehow 
independently at fault, the verdict against Wardley should have been vacated by the 
trial court" (Brief of Appellant, p. 13). 
"It appears the jury accepted the position of [Ms. Brown] and allocated specific awards 
to both Richards and Wardley totaling eighteen thousand dollars ($18,000.00)" [R. 371] 
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[R.371] 
The General Verdict Sheet was submitted to the jury with out objection3. The 
form was prepared by counsel and submitted to the jury. The fact that the form contains 
language to the effect that the jury found liability and awarded damages separately and 
distinctly against Richards and Wardley is the fault of counsel and should not be used as 
a basis for claiming that the jury went off on its own and made specific findings against 
either defendant. Clearly the jury was trying to follow the Court's instruction by filling 
out the entire form. Instruction No. 48 told the jury it was "your duty to answer the 
questions in the general (sic) verdict sheet I will submit to you". [R. 245] A review of 
the General Verdict Sheet shows the jury did indeed answer every question. 
Furthermore, it is unreasonable to believe the jury made findings of 
compensatory damages amounting to $9,000.00 dollars, rather than allocating 
$18,000.00, because Wardley never argued damages to the jury. Only Ms. Brown 
argued damages to the jury and the amount requested was $18,000.00. [Transcript of 
Closing Argument p. 14] The $9,000.00 damages stipulation asserted by Wardley for 
the first time on this appeal was never presented to the jury via an instruction or 
argument. How then could the jury have limited its award to only $9,000.00? Clearly 
the jury allocated an $18,000.00 award in an effort to comply with Instruction No. 48. 
The jury was instructed that as a corporation, Wardley could only act through its 
The General Verdict Sheet is attached as Addenda B. 
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agents and that the act of an agent was the act of the corporation.4 Liability of a 
corporation for the acts of its agents is well settled. Sullivan v. Evans-Morris-Whitney, 
Co. 180 P. 435 (1919), Weyeth Hardware & Manufacturing, Co. v. James-Spencer-
Bateman, Co., 47 P. 604 (1897). 
The issue submitted to the jury concerning Wardley was fraud. [426 Transcript, 
p. 159] Wardley is subject to liability for Richard's fraud if it was committed in the 
furtherance of Wardley's interest5. Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771 (Utah 1988). On 
direct examination, Richards testified he was a "sales executive" for Wardley during the 
entire time he represented the Millers and facilitated the sale of the Home to Ms. 
Brown. [425 Transcript, p. 131] He further testified that Wardley would receive half the 
commission from the sale of the Home. [425 Transcript, p. 201] Since Richard's was 
Wardley's agent in this transaction, and since his sales commission was also Wardley's 
commission, Wardley is reasonably subject to liability for Richard's fraud. 
A. The jury entered a single verdict against Richards and allocated that verdict 
between Richards and Wardley. 
Wardley next argues that a single judgment against Richards will make 
Instruction No. 28, "Wardley Better Homes & Gardens is a corporation and, as such, 
can act only through its officers and employees, and others designated by it as its agents. 
Any act or omission of an officer, employee or agent of a corporation, in the performance 
of the duties or within the scope of the authority of the officer, employee or agent, is the 
act or omission of the corporation. [R. 225] 
Instruction No. 33 "If an agent wrongfully committed and act...the principal is liable for 
the intentional act or omission only if (1) the act or omission was committed or omitted 
in the furtherance of the principal's interests...." MUJI 25.13 
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Ms. Brown whole for the fraud committed. [Principal Memorandum, p. 9] What 
Wardley continually fails to understand is the jury's verdict was a single verdict 
allocated between jointly liable defendants. 
This allocation is not a reversible error, and does not call for a new trial. Rather, 
it represents a clerical error made in good faith by the jury in an effort to follow the 
Court's instructions, which may be corrected by this court to reflect the true nature of 
the verdict. Rule 60(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Stanger v. Sentinal Security Life 
Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983), Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 
701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985). 
B. The punitive damages award is supported by substantial evidence of ratification 
by Wardley. 
With respect to the punitive damages award, it is not a separate and distinct 
award, but is based upon vicarious liability and ratification of Richards' conduct by 
Wardley. Wardley should not be allowed to confuse the issue by claiming the jury 
capriciously held Wardley liable for some action separate and distinct from Richards' 
fraud. 
The trial Court did not fail to direct a verdict in favor of Wardley on the punitive 
damages issue because Wardley did not move for a directed verdict as to punitive 
damages6 and Wardley has not contested this finding on appeal. Failure to challenge the 
In its memorandum Decision on Wardley's motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, the trial court found "At the conclusion of [Ms. Brown's] case, [Wardley] did 
not make a motion for a directed verdict." [R. 369] 
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sufficiency of the evidence at trial prevents Wardley from attacking the evidence on 
appeal. Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975). 
C. Wardley ratified and approved Richard's fraudulent representations. 
As Wardley correctly points out in its principal memorandum, under the facts of 
this case it could only be liable for the punitive damages assessed against Richards if it 
ratified or approved of Richards' fraudulent act. (Appellant's Brief, p.l 1). 
1. Wardley failed to marshal the evidence. 
"On appeal, the court reviews the evidence presented at trial in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party and will reverse a trial court's decision only if the 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Moreover, the appealing party has the 
burden of marshaling the evidence in support of the verdict and then showing that it is 
insufficient." Fitz v. Synthes, 990 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah 1999). Where a party fails to 
marshal the evidence, the appellate court will not disturb the verdict. Wright v. 
Westside Nursery 787 P.2d 508, 514 (Ut. Ct. App.1990). "The burden on an appellant 
to establish that the evidence does not support the jury's verdict... is quite heavy." 
Dejavue, Inc v. U.S. Energy Corp, 993 P.2d 222, 226 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999) citing 
Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987). "Review of the jury's 
verdict, however, places a difficult burden on the challenging party. T o support a claim 
that the jury verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, an appellant must 
marshal all of the evidence that supports the findings and demonstrate that when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is insufficient evidence to support it.' 
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Furthermore, all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the verdict, and if the 
evidence supports the verdict, we will affirm" Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assoc, 910 
P.2d 1252, 1257 (Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted). 
It is the duty of the Appellant to painstakingly and fastidiously identify why that 
evidence fails to support the verdict. Interiors Contracting, Inc., v. Smith, Halander & 
Smith, 881 P.2d 929, 933 (Ct. App. 1994). It is inappropriate for the Appellant simply 
to cite facts which support its claim that the evidence is insufficient; rather, the 
Appellant is to identify all evidence having any tendency to support the verdict. Bell v. 
Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Ct. App. 1989). 
On page 11 of its principal Memorandum, Wardley speaks to the ratification 
issue and states: 
Finally, there is no evidence that a principal or managerial 
agent of Wardley ever ratified or approved of the 
misrepresentations complained of by Ms. Brown. 
Despite the burden imposed upon Wardley to marshal the evidence on appeal and 
challenge the evidence in detail, this simple sentence is all Wardley says about 
ratification, which fails to satisfy the marshaling requirement. 
2. Substantial evidence of ratification exists. 
If this Court were to find this simple statement sufficient to satisfy the 
marshaling burden placed upon Wardley on this appeal, it is clear that sufficient 
evidence exists from which the jury could conclude Wardley ratified Richards' 
behavior. 
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Steven Goff, the managing broker at the office where Mr. Richards worked for 
Wardley, indicated he was contacted by Linda Ms. Brown and advised of problems with 
the Home and the misrepresentations made to her by Richards. [426 Transcript, pp. 169-
175]: 
1) Goff indicated that his initial response to these claims of fraud against 
Richards was disbelief. [426 Transcript, p. 171]; 
2) He communicated the concerns to Richards, upon which Richards 
indicated that yes, the appraisal had come back low, but Ms. Brown had 
decided to go ahead with the purchase anyway. [426 Transcript, pp. 172-
174]. 
In his second conversation with Ms. Brown, Goff indicated to Ms. Brown that 
she had ample opportunity on her own to review the appraisal and determine the value 
of the Home, he stated: 
1) ". . . and there is nothing I can do to go and to reverse it". [426 
Transcript, p. 174] ; 
2) He further told her: "The best I can do is get in touch with the Millers 
and tell them of your complaint". Id 
3) Finally, he stated: "I was very clear to her that we, as a real estate 
company, had no obligation to fix problems". [426 Transcript, p. 175] 
Upon further complaints by Ms. Brown, Mr. Goff said that he would agree to list 
the house and allow it to be resold. Ms. Brown indicated that this was ridiculous 
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because the condition the house was in would not make it reasonable for any person to 
purchase it. [426 Transcript, pp. 177-178] Goff further indicated that they would be 
happy to disclose all of the defects in the Home. However, this was an unreasonable 
position for Ms. Brown to take because she would have then had to sell the Home for 
less than it was worth to her. Accordingly, she decided to file suit against Wardley and 
Richards. 
In determining whether or not a principal has ratified the conduct of its agent for 
purposes of punitive damages under Hodges v Gibson Products Co , 811 P.2d 141 
(Utah 1991); relying on Restatement (Second) of Agency §217C (1958) and 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909 (1979), several factors come into context. Among 
these are whether: 
1) the principal "continued the employment of the agent", Meleski v Finero 
Int'lRestaurant, Inc, 424 A.2d 784, 792 (Maryland 1981), citing 
Wardman-Justice Motors v. Petrie, 39 F.2d 512 (DC Cir.); 
2) whether the agent was reprimanded, whether the principal continued to 
support the conduct of the agent at trial, Smith's Food & Drug Centers, 
Inc. v Argentine Bellgarde, 958 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Nev. 1998) ; 
3) whether the principal allowed the conduct to occur without intervention, 
Kortmeier v Ferbend& Ferbend, Ltd, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19164; 
4) failure to promptly repudiate the act, Grandi v. LeSage, 399 P.2d 285, 
293 (N.M. 1965); and 
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5) whether the principal defends the action of the agent at trial. Smith's 
Food and Drug Centers, Inc. v. Bellegarde, 958 P.2d 1208, 1214 (Nev. 1998) 
In view of the foregoing precedents, the following facts support ratification: 
1) Mr. Goff met Ms. Brown's claims with disbelief and accepted Richards 
excuses at face value; [426 Transcript, p. 171] 
2) Wardley accepted the benefits of the sale by enjoying the proceeds of the 
sales commission; [425 Transcript, p. 201] 
3) Wardley continued Richards employment; and [425 Transcript, p. 129] 
4) At trial, as the final witness, Goff sat through all of the direct and cross-
examination of every witness, including Ms. Brown and Richards, the 
same evidence which the jury heard and concluded gave rise to a finding 
of fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Despite this clear and 
convincing evidence of fraud, Goff stated at trial that Richards was a 
"person of absolute integrity" and he wished he had a "truck load of 
agents" like Richards working for him. [426 Transcript, pp. 168-169] 
Considering that this Court is required to view the evidence of ratification in the 
light most favorable to Ms. Brown, there is clearly ample evidence to support the jury's 
finding that Wardley ratified the behavior of Richards and is therefore liable for punitive 
damages assigned to him in the amount of $27,000.00. 
II. At the close of Ms. Brown's case in chief, counsel agreed to instruct the jury on 
a damages formula but did not stipulate to a cap on damages. 
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In its principal memorandum Wardley next argues a stipulation capped 
compensatory damages against Richards and Wardley on the fraud claim. At the close 
of Ms. Brown's case in chief, the parties stipulated to dismiss several causes of action. 
Additionally, counsel for Wardley requested an instruction for the jury stating the 
maximum measure of damages "[is] the difference between [the amount] paid and what 
the [home is worth]". [426 Transcript, p. 150] In this case, it was the difference 
between $109,000.00 and $100,000.00. Counsel for Ms. Brown agreed and the Court 
ordered this stipulation be submitted to the jury in the form of the instruction prepared 
by counsel. [426 Transcript, pp. 151-160] 
At the conclusion of the trial, instructions were submitted to the jury without 
objection. [Closing Argument Transcript, p. 56]. Instruction No. 44, the compensatory 
damages instruction stated the appropriate measure of damages was the difference 
between the value of the house ($100,000.00) and the value of the house as represented 
($118,000.00). The jury instruction which Mr. Sabin requested and which the Court 
ordered was never submitted to the jury. Likewise, Mr. Sabin did not argue damages to 
the jury. Furthermore, in its Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, 
Wardley did not object to Instruction No. 44, but instead argued this instruction could 
only have led the jury to conclude $9,000.00 was the proper measure of damages. 
Within the context of the record, the upshot of this claim by Wardley is that the 
wrong instruction went to the jury. Rule 51 Utah R. Civ. P., requires "[i]f instructions 
are to be given to the jury in writing, all objections thereto must be made before the 
-13-
instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections may be made to the instructions 
after they are give to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider the verdict. No 
party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto." Utah case law is replete with cases requiring parties to object at trial or 
lose the right to contest instructions on appeal. In Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 
1975), we are instructed that a claim of error for failing to give a desired instruction is 
meritless on appeal if the party requesting the instruction failed to object at the trial 
court's failure to give the instruction. Since Wardley never objected to Instruction 
No. 44, or sought to enforce the stipulation at the trial level, it may not do so now. 
III. The verdict was not set aside because Wardley did not move for a directed 
verdict and because there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. 
Ms. Brown next argues the alleged verdict against Wardley should be set aside 
because there was no separate and distinct claim made against Wardley. Again, 
Wardley misunderstands the verdict of the jury and the liability stipulations at trial. It 
was recognized, understood and stipulated at trial that Wardley was vicariously liable 
for the conduct of Richards as to compensatory damages. [R. 149-161] Therefore, the 
jury's verdict of $18,000.00 in compensatory damages is chargeable to Richards and to 
Wardley. Furthermore, as the foregoing analysis shows, there was sufficient evidence 
presented at trial for the jury to find Wardley ratified and approved of Richards' 
behavior. Therefore, as the jury found, Wardley is liable for the punitive damages 
assigned to Richards in the amount of $27,000.00. 
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It should be remembered Wardley stipulated to dismissal of all claims but fraud 
and never contested the evidence supporting punitive damages. Thus, Wardley is liable 
for all of the damages found in this case which are $18,000.00 compensatory and 
$27,000.00 punitive. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Brown requests that the jury's verdict be 
affirmed and that she be entitled to collect $18,000.00 compensatory damages and 
$27,000.00 punitive damages jointly and severally from Richards and Wardley, and that 
she further be entitled to pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, along with her costs 
at trial and on appeal. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 29, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellee hereby 
requests oral argument on this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this A / day of September, 2000. 
SMITH, KNOWLES & HAMILTON, P.C. 
: u ^ , ) L ^ : rj,i 
T3ANA T. FARMER 
DAVID L. KNOWLES 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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A Division of Reed Elsevier Inc. 
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State Rules 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VI . TRIALS 
URCP Rule 5 1 (2000) 
Rule 5 1 . Instructions to ju ry ; objections. 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier t ime as the court reasonably directs, any 
party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said 
requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to 
instructing the jury ; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, 
unless the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or otherwise waive this 
requirement. If the instructions are to be given in wri t ing, all objections thereto must be 
made before the instructions are given to the jury ; otherwise, objections may be made to the 
instructions after they are given to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. 
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects 
thereto. In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter 
to which he objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the foregoing 
requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice, may review 
the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Opportunity shall be given to make objections, 
and they shall be made out of the hearing of the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the court has instructed the jury. 
The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court states any of the 
evidence, it must instruct the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
HISTORY: (Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
NOTES: 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule varies substantially from Rule 5 1 , F.R.C.P., after which it is 
patterned. 
Cross References. — Exceptions unnecessary, U.R.C.P. 46. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Comments on evidence. 
— Allowed and disallowed. 
— Proper. 
Accurate statement of facts. 
Copy of instructions. 
-- Delay. 
TabB 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY. OODEN DEPARTMENT 
UNDA BROWN, 
Plaintiff (8), 
vs. ; 
ROBERT L. MILLER; OWNA MILLER, ] 
GERALD E RICHARDS; WARDLEY 
BETTER HOMES & GARDENS; ) 
STEVEN B. GOFF; and DOES 1-10. 
Defendant (s). ) 
GENERAL VERDICT 
) SHEET 
I Case No. 960900289 CN 
Members of the Jury: 
We, the jury in the above-entitled action, find for the plaintiff and against the defendant, 
Robert Milter and Owna Miller, and fix the amount of compensatory damages at $ T \+&& 
and the amount of punitive damages at $ I *&£> 
or, 
We, the jury ;n the above-entitled action, find in favor of the defendant, Robert MfHer and 
Owna Milter, and award no damages to the plaintiff. VkS _ (V£z ofl. /MO) 
and/or, 
We, the jury in the above-entitled action, find for the plaintiff and against the defendant 
GeraJd E. Richanfa, and fix the amount of compensatory damages at $ i>a&0 . and the 
amount of punitive damages at $ T . £>£>£> . 
or, 
We, the jury in the above-entitied action, find In favor of the defendant, Gerald E 
Richards, and award no damages to the plaintiff MO ( V £ S Ofc r*t>\ 
and/or. 
General Verdict Sheet 
960900289 CN 
Page Two 
We, the jury in the above-entitled action find for the plaintiff and against the defendant; 
Wardley Better Homes & Gardens, and fix the amount of compensatory damages at 
S ^OOO . and the amount of punitive damages at $ *2 &, DO& 
or, 
We, the jury in the above-entitled action find in favor of the defendant Wardley Better 
Homes & Gardens, and award no damages to the plaintiff. \J O \*c* ^ ^ Q 
DATED this 3 - 1 day of February, 1998. 
CX5-H 3 .£ \O^WJA*K>»^ 
